

Insecure By Design How Not to Build Your Next Data Pipeline

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Introduction – David Handermann



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Summary

Insecure by design: How does it happen?

- 1. Not **Encrypting** Communications
- 2. Not **Authenticating** Peers
- 3. Not **Validating** Inputs
- 4. Not **Enumerating** Outputs
- 5. Not **Expecting** Errors



TLS is hard

Let's go shopping...




TLS Issues: Unsupported or Misconfigured

- HTTP instead of HTTPS
- Excessive trust in TLS Termination Gateways
- Log Collection without TLS
- Database Connections without TLS
- Caching and Coordination without TLS




TLS Termination: Where is the boundary?





TLS Gateways: Not Quite Zero Trust





TLS Configuration: Is it actually secure?

- Which Version? TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated
 - TLS 1.2 supports insecure cipher suites
- Which Cipher Suites? Avoid **unauthenticated** ciphers
 - TLS 1.3 requires **AES-GCM** or **ChaCha20-Poly1305**



SFTP is easier

How is it configured?



SFTP Configuration: Which algorithms allowed?

- Which Cipher Algorithms? Many legacy algorithms
 - Prefer AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305
- Which Key Exchange Algorithms?
 - Prefer ssh-ed25519 or rsa-sha2-256
- Which Message Authentication Code Algorithms?
 - MD5 and SHA-1 should be disabled



Are these the droids you're looking for?



Pipeline Authentication: What could go wrong?

- Trusted Networks
- Custom Authorities with Mutual TLS
- Personal Usernames and Passwords
- User Access Tokens
- Shared Service Accounts



Trusted Networks: What is the blast radius?

- What if the gateway is misconfigured?
- What if the processing system is manipulated?
- Does the **storage service** permit elevated access?




Mutual TLS: Bidirectional Authentication

- Certificate Authorities approve or deny peers
- Root and intermediate authorities issue certificates
- Organization authority or service authority?
- What is the identification strategy?
 - Subject Principal or Alternative Names



User Credentials: Not so service-oriented

- Ambiguous attribution: user or machine?
- Unintended access privileges
- Single point of responsibility





Shared Credentials: Service access surprises

- Unclear system boundaries
- Credential rotation chain reactions
- Enterprise issues waiting to happen



Validation is a Security Concern



CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Denial of Service from Resource Exhaustion



Basic Validation Rules

- 1. Size
- 2. Shape
- 3. Semantics



Size Validation: What is too big to process?

- Unanticipated Data Rates
- Unexpected File Sizes
- Unsupportable Field Lengths
- Unconstrained Compression Ratios



OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space

- Just increase maximum heap size?
- Just increase system memory?
- Just hope it does not recur?



Size Validation: How big is too big?

- A little validation goes a long way
- Apache NiFi RouteOnAttribute Processor
 - Property: size-exceeded
 - Value: \${fileSize:gt(1048576)}



Format Validation: How big is that value?

- Apache Avro Limits System Properties
- Apache POI ZipSecureFile Methods
- Jackson JSON StreamReadConstraints
- Jetty Maximum HTTP Request Header Size



Shape Validation: Paint by Magic Numbers

- Unexpected Errors from Unexpected Formats
- MIME Type Detection versus Expected Inputs
 - Apache Tika provides extensible detection
 - Apache NiFi IdentifyMimeType uses Apache Tika



Semantic Validation: Some assembly required

- Field Type Specifications
 - Is it an int or a long?
- Field Value Ranges
 - TCP port number **65536**?
- Field Requirements versus Extensibility
 - Just what is optionally required?



Semantic Validation: Schema definitions

- Common Formats
 - Apache Avro Schema
 - JSON Schema
 - XML Schema
- Lack of versioning leads to lack of validation



Do you know where your data is going?



Data Transmission: What and where?

- How dynamic is the data?
- How flexible are the destinations?
- Who controls the routing?



Data-Driven Routing: Field-based destination?

```
"id": 1,
"action": "STARTED",
"topic": "events",
"uri": "https://events.local"
```



Data-Driven Routing: Field-based flow

- NiFi EvaluateJsonPath Processor
 - Property: destinationUri
 - Value: \$.uri
- NiFi InvokeHTTP Processor
 - Property: **URL**
 - Value: \${destinationUri}



Data-Driven Routing: Parameterized flow

- NiFi EvaluateJsonPath Processor
 - Property: topic
 - Value: \$.topic
- NiFi InvokeHTTP Processor
 - Property: **URL**
 - Value: https://events.local/\${topic}



No plan for failure is planning to fail



Ignoring Murphy's Law

- Terminated failure relationships
- Infinite **retries** without backoff strategies
- Unconstrained logging
- Missing or misconfigured socket timeouts
- Custom code with minimal verification



Failure Handling: Availabilty and integrity

- Ignoring errors leads to data loss
- Poor exception handling leads to performance loss
- Excessive logging exhausts resources



Socket Timeouts: **How long is too long?**

- Infinite timeouts lead to blocked threads
- Short timeouts lead to unexpected closed streams
- Uncoordinated timeouts and retries waste cycles



Custom Code: Works on my machine?

- System.exit() is not error handling
- System properties are not component configuration
- Reading all bytes is not stream processing



Conclusion

Security is a cross-cutting concern



Conclusion

Secure pipelines by design

- 1. Encrypt Communications Correctly
- 2. Authenticate Peers Properly
- 3. Validate Inputs Extensively
- 4. Enumerate Outputs Completely
- 5. **Expect** Errors **Comprehensively**



Conclusion

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